Violation of the Freedom of Religion in East Turkistan

Since 1949 the Chinese government policies towards the Islamic faith and practices in East Turkistan (aka Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) have alternated between “radical intolerance” especially during the 1960s and 1970s to “controlled tolerance” [1] with “the relative openness” starting from the early 1980s [2]. Religion had been tolerated to a limited degree until the end of the 1990s [3].

Yet, all but in East Turkistan, the tolerance towards religious education has allowed all mosques throughout China to organize classes in Arabic and Islamic studies for all members of society. The graduates from those institutes are even able to establish smaller independent religious schools. Only in East Turkistan, the perceived link between Islamic knowledge or identity and Uyghur ethnic separatism or resistance has stopped the government from regulating such policies [4].  

This being the case, right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there occurred a “rhetorical shift” in dealing with Uyghur resistance, as the PRC for the first time officially asserted the existence of the Uyghur terrorist threat in China. In other words, Uyghur “separatism” has become “terrorism”, as a result of a convenient conflation of Islam with violence and terrorism [5].  The sole state media as well has intentionally reinforced the imagined connection between Islam and terrorism in the context of East Turkistan [6]. In other words, the government has started to conveniently use the global “war on terror” rhetoric to suppress the Uyghur rights to practice Islam and access Islamic knowledge and education [7].  

Since then, the Islamic knowledge, ideology and practices have been increasingly obstructed and subject to questioning in all social spheres, most notably in educational institutions in East Turkistan. Young people under 18 have been banned from attending mosque prayers and forbidden to have any religious education in underground madrasas [8]. Wearing religious symbols and engaging in religious activities, including praying, fasting during Ramadan, etc. have been outlawed in all educational institutions in East Turkistan [9]. Thus, the Uyghurs’ right to access Islamic knowledge and practice Islam has been increasingly restricted and diminished. This trend has become more drastic and exaggerated since 2009 under Xi’s rule; ‘a wide range of routine and peaceful aspects of religious observance that were once permissible have been arbitrarily labelled as “illegal activities” or “religious extremism” [10].

Such a repression has reached the highest level since Chinese government official Chen Quanguo, who was transferred from Tibet Autonomous Region to East Turkistan in August 2016, began an intensive securitization program targeting the Islamic knowledge sharing and observance among the Uyghurs in early 2017 [11]. New rules launched in October 2016 to restrict the Uyghur parents from teaching their children religious knowledge and attracting or forcing their children into religious activities. The perpetrators would face serious penalties. Giving Uyghur babies Islamic names has been banned, as well [12]. In March 2017, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification was adopted, further restricting the religious knowledge or information sharing in all private and public spaces, while explicitly emphasizing “making religion [referring to Islam – author] more Chinese and under law, and actively guide religions to become compatible with socialist society” (Article 4). Accordingly, the Regulations states that religious schools and institutions also “should adhere to the direction of sinocizing [sic] religion, and earnestly perform the duties of cultivating and training religious professionals, to prevent permeation by extremification” (Article 40) [13]. Sinicizing here obviously means ‘secularizing’ or ‘modernizing’ under the discourse of Chinese Chauvinism, which, in this context, characterizes Islam as a backward and innately violent religion. It is possible that thousands of mosques in East Turkistan have been demolished since early 2017 [14]. 

Subsequently, those who have been suspected as being too religious or showing signs of radicalization (including participating in very mainstream religious activities like praying, fasting, wearing religious symbols, men wearing hijab and growing beard, abstinence from alcohol, etc.) are sent to newly opened “education and transformation training centers” (教育转化培训中心) or “Counter-extremism Training Schools” (去极端化培训班), where they must stay for months or indefinitely away from their families to “unlearn” their religious ideologies. Since their inception in early 2017, these schools have been opened in many parts of Turkistan and have already “re-educated” hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims [15]. Currently, it is estimated that between one to three million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims could be living in those Nazi style political education centers where conditions are extremely poor [16]. The prominent Human Rights advocate, journalist and editor Sheng Xue regards those re-education centers as eviler and more dangerous than the Nazi concentrations camps, as the former destroys the identity, dignity, and self-respect of the detainees, while the latter only obliterated the physical bodies [17].

Furthermore, it is known that recently all Uyghur students who were studying Islam in Egypt have been required to go back to China. Reportedly, under the pressure of Chinese authorities, the Egyptian government arrested and extradited many Uyghur students [18].  The students who returned either disappeared or have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms [19].

In sum, recent developments indicate that the religious and cultural oppression has reached its unprecedented level. The international community should give more attention to the current plights of the Uyghurs.

References

[1] Waite, E. (2007) The emergence of Muslim reformism in contemporary Xinjiang; Implications for the Uyghurs' positioning between a Central Asian and Chinese context. In I. Bellér-Hann., C. Cesaro, R. Harris & amp; J. Smith (Eds.), Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, (pp. 56-78). Ashgate Press: Aldershot.

[2] Millward, JA & amp; Lost, PC (2004). Chapter 2: Political and cultural history of the Xinjiang region through the late nineteenth century. In S. Frederick Starr (Ed.), Xinjiang: China & # 39; s Muslim Borderland, (pp. 40–41). ME Sharpe.

[3] Roberts, SR (2004). A 'land of borderlands': Implications of Xinjiang's trans-border interactions. In S. Frederick Starr (Ed.), Xinjiang: China & # 39; s Muslim Borderland, (pp. 216-237). ME Sharpe.

[4] Armijo, J. (2017). Islamic education in China. In H. Daun & amp; R. Arjmand (Eds.), Handbook of Islamic education, International handbooks of religion and education. (pp. 797-808), Springer International Publishing AG.

[5] Roberts, SR (2018). The biopolitics of China's “war on terror” and the exclusion of the Uyghurs, Critical Asian Studies. 50 (2), 232-258. DOI: 10.1080 / 14672715.2018.1454111

[6] Harris, R. (2014). The Changing Uyghur Religious Soundscape. Performing Islam, 3 (1 & amp; 2), 93-114.

[7] Bovingdon, G. (2010). The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press .; Bovingdon, G. (2014). In WE Joseph (Ed.). Politics in China: An introduction (second edition). (pp. 248-251), Oxford University Press.

[8] Kanat, BK (2015, April 12). Uighurs as the invisible victims of the international system. Daily Sabah. Retrieved from http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/kilic-bugra-kanat/2015/04/13/uighurs-as-the-invisible-victims- of-the-international-system .; Roberts, S. (2018). The biopolitics of China's.

[9] Dearden, L. (2017, March). China bans burqas and & # 39; abnormal & # 39; beards in Muslim province of Xinjiang. Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-burqa-abnormal-beards-ban-muslim- province-East Turkestan-veils-province-extremism-crackdown-freedom-a7657826.html

[10] Cook, SG (2017). The battle for China & # 39; s spirit: Religious revival, repression, and resistance under Xi Jinping. New York: Freedom House.

[11] Millward, JA (2018, February 3). What it's like to live in a surveillance state. New York Times. Retrieved from https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-uighurs.html

[12] Haas, B. (2017, April 25). China bans religious names for Muslim babies in Xinjiang. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/25/china-bans-religious-names-for- muslims-babies-in-xinjiang 13 For more information, see http: //www.iuhrdf .org / content / xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-regulation- de-extremification

[14] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission- to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang 15 Thum, R. ( 2018, May 15). What Really Happens in China's 'Re-education' Camps. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-re-education-camps.html; Smith Finley, J. (2018, June

[15] Islam in Xinjiang: “De-Extremification” or Violation of Religious Space? Asia Dialogue. Retrieved from http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/06/15/islam-in-East Turkestan-de- extremification-or-violation-of-religious-space /

[16] Thum, R. & amp; Wasserstrom, J. (2018, July, 3). The dark side of the Chinese dream: We should pay more attention to Beijing's repressive actions. The Nation. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/dark-side- chinese-dream /; Zenz, A. (2019, July 16).

You Can't Force People to Assimilate. So Why Is China at It Again? The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/16/opinion/china-East Turkestan-repression-uighurs-minorities-backfire.html; Zeiger, H. (2020, Feb. 26).

China: Sophisticated surveillance decides who gets sent to camps. Mind Matters. Retrieved from https://mindmatters.ai/2020/02/china-sophisticated-surveillance-decides-who-gets-sent-to-uyghur-camps/; Abdulla, M. (2020. Feb. 5).

Uyghurs and the China Coronavirus An epidemic and crowded mass detention camps are a potentially deadly combination. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/uyghurs-and-the-china-coronavirus/

[17] Sheng Xue expressed this view when interviewed by Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. The Uyghur human rights advocate Nuri Turkel also echoed her perspective highlighting the inhumane treatments of the Uyghurs detained in those re-education camps. For more information, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEjjr1o-GFY

[18] Batke, J. (2017, August 14). China is forcing Uighurs abroad to return home. Why aren't more countries refusing to help? China File. Retrieved from http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-forcing- uighurs-abroad-return-home-why-arent-more-countries

[19] Smith, A. (2017, July 19). 'The victims of international terrorism are the Uyghurs'. Middle East Monitor (MEM). Retrieved from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170719-the-victims-of-international-terrorism-are-the-uyghurs/